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Introduction
A sizeable number of studies undertaken on airline networks have examined network
configurations, efficiency issues related to networks, networks and cost functions,
economies of structure and size, network utilisation and the selection of routes in the
airline network. The studies have predominantly examined domestic aviation networks,
in particular those in the US after deregulation. The international aviation market has
received limited attention.
There are, however, important trends that are taking place in international
aviation. These continue to change the modus operandi of airlines. With the US already
in its second economic cycle of a deregulated regime, Europe '93 promising to bring
with it increased commercial freedoms, and the Asia-Pacific region's airlines becoming
commercial bulwarks, it is  desirable that new econometric odelling paradigms that
factor in these changes be developed. The liberalisation of international aviation has a
number of competitive implications for airlines. There are market forces inducing the
airline industry towards increasing airline connectivity. There is ample evidence that
consumers prefer to deal with a single network airline.
Generally, the modelling of competitive scenarios in international aviation has
been conducted in the framework of 'trade in services' (see Weisman, 1990, and Findlay
and Forsyth, 1985). The analysis has been premised on the comparative advantage
theories of trade, the most pervasive of which has been the Hecks r-Ohlin model of
comparative factor advantage. The changing nature of international aviation, via liberal
bilaterals, globalising networks and single aviation markets, calls for a different approach
(see Nyathi, 1992). Moreover, the macro-level analysis of competition in services
between nations does not provide a sound benchmark for fashioning out the individual
firm's competitive strategy. Taneja and Stearns (1989) allude to the need for a different
modelling approach, but stop short of proposing one.
International aviation presents an awkward operating environment (albeit one
that does not lend itself to easy econometric mod lling). It is primarily regulated by
bilateral agreements between governments. On some markets, the bilateral  are more
liberal than in others.There are some pitfalls in extending models that have been used to
analyse domestic aviation markets in the deregulated US regime to the international
arena. It is in recognition of these drawbacks and the need to formulate a comprehensive
and contextual framework that the approach taken here has been proposed.
The paper is organised as follows; in the next section we present a working
definition of an airline's network and extend the 'traditional' definition of network to
include strategic alliances. In the succeeding section, an attempt is made to link
competitive strategy and airline networks. In the penultimate section we propose a
modelling framework and the probable mode ling outputs before drawing conclusions as
to what further research is required.
International airline network model
A working definition of an airline network
An airline network is the integration of separate routes into a geographical pattern.
Demand for travel between a pair of communities represents a potential market. If a
market has sufficient revenue potential or if a route between a city-pair would provide an
essential link in the system, an airline is likely to begin scheduled flights between the city-
pair. The way the airline links various routes (the spatial dimension) and coordinates
schedules (the temporal dimension) defines the firm's network.
Networks exist in a variety of configurations. At the simplest level, it is a single
city-pair. They can also be complex - characterised by indirect routing and multiple city-
pairs. The possibility of indirect routing enables the airline to establish a network which
can help protect critical markets from competition, control costs and to differentiate its
service.
In the international aviation context, Oum et al. (1993) extend the definition of
network to include strategic alliances between airlines of different nations. In what they
call 'global airline networks', a group of affiliated airlines offer seamless services to
consumers through joint use of computer reservation systems, throughfares and
ticketing, automatic baggage transfers, coordinated flight schedules, code sharing of
flights, joint marketing, sharing of frequent flier programs, joint purchasing of aircraft
and fuel. For all practical purposes, to consumers, it is like using a single airline
company. Strategic alliances, therefore can be viewed as an instrument of increasing
both network size (market coverage) and sprucing up network structure (optimal route
configuration and connectivity). Network size represents the number of nodes that an
airline serves. It relates to geographical market coverage. An extensive nodal coverage
does not necessarily confer network economies - there are at best constant returns to
scale associated with network size. Route configuration and connectivity refer to the
manner in which the airline links the various nodes in its network. The airline might elect
(subject to constraints such as bilateral terms) to use the hub-and-spoke system or some
other system such as the turnaround route system. Optimal route configuration and
connectivity are also closely linked with scheduling. The scheduling regime in a hub-and-
spoke system for instance, will be substantially different from that in a tournarou d
system. In a hub-and-spoke system the airline may have banks or complexes but these
are not possible in the turnaround route system.
An overriding theme here is that airline networks represent both the product of
the firm and also the production plan: each segment may be seen as an asset of the firm,
contributing the production of flights not only on that route, but also adjoining routes,
since connecting passengers are 'by-products' in the process. Airline networks can be
viewed as multi-product.
There are three generic types of networks in the airline industry; the linear
network, the hub-and-spoke network and the turnaround route system (Sorenson,
1990). Figure 1 illustrates the three.
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Figure 1 The three generic route systems
In the linear network, the airline, makes several stops in order to gather enough
passengers. In the hub-and-spoke system airlin s build their networks by combining
features from non-stop and multi-stop routing patterns. Airlines coordinate schedules of
in-bound and out-bound flights. The turn-around system uses the 'high density approach'
where there is little economy to be gained in expanding the geographical scale of links
between nodes that have a large demand for interacting with each other. Airlines in
international aviation may be constrained by b laterals as to their network structure, but
where the bilaterals are liberal, airlines may use a combination of all three, but will tend
to emphasise one of them.
The link between competitive strategy and networking
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There has been much controversy and discussion in the literature relating to industrial
organisation about whether the firm or industry or some other intra-indust y group
stratification is the appropriate unit of analysis. Recent developments in oligopoly theory
have done much to resurrect interest in analysis at the firm level by concentrating on
interactions in markets where one firm's actions affect its rivals ( see McGee and
Thomas, 1986).
The approach taken in this paper is to concentrate on the aviation industry at the
firm level. A game theory approach, where firms take strategic manuvoures against each
other in an attempt to gain competitive advantage is adopted (see Fisk, 1984). The link
between competitive strategy and networking has not been clearly identified in the
literature, yet the airline network represents both the production plan f the airline and
its product. The strategy of an org isation is the course of action it selects to ensure
that it  achieves its goals and enhances its chances of long term viability in the face of
changing circumstances and an uncertain future. The strategy gives the or anisation a
direction - that is a set of guidelines used to commit resources. By committing resources,
an organisation binds itself to the course it has chosen. Porter (1985) suggests that the
firm's strategy is related to advancing or maintaining its position. The strategy can be
defined as the determination of long term goals and the objectives of an enterprise, and
the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources for carrying out these
goals. For most businesses, the objective is to achieve targets of profitability.
Profitability must be achieved in an environment that comprises other organisations also
vying to raise their competitive advantage. The groups, organisations, and individuals in
the competitive environment consist of rivals, potential entrants, substitutes, buyers and
suppliers.
There are general courses of acti n available to firms which they can vary and
combine to suit their perception of the competitive situation. Each course of action is
based on constructing barriers designed to restrict the courses of action available to
rivals and other entrants in the environment. In non-transportation industries, there are
basically two generic strategies - cost leadership and product/service differentiation. In
transportation, it is also possible for a firm to base its strategy on its ability to deny other
firms access to a geographic market area. Barriers created by firms employing strategies
based on cost leadership or differentiation are built by presenting the potential entrant
with an unacceptably high cost of entering a market. In aviation, an alternative strategy
is based on controlling access to transportation facilities such as airports or terminal
facilities or landing slots in a region.
Because of their high fixed costs, and relatively low variable costs, transportation
firms have a strong motivation to seek monopolistic control over some of their territory.
The idea is to eliminate competition in parts of its system in order to cross-subsidise
routes where competition drives rates and fares below the break-even point. A firm's
power to set prices derives in part from its ability to assign consumers to different
markets and its ability to attain at least local monopoly power over a group of these
separate consumer groups. This is a strategy that Sorenson (1990) terms area monopoly.
In the deregulated and liberalising airline industry, airlines have gained significant level of
control of traffic generating in the airport's air travel hinterland due to such factors as the
slot allocation system and the nature of the hub-and-spoke system.
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The ability of a firm to vary its strategy by targeting a group of consumers or a
geographic region, increases a firm's strategic options to the point that Porter (1985)
considers a focus to be a separate strategy.
In summary, the two broad courses of action for an airline would be to employ
the generic aspatial strategies - cost leadership or differentiation. And since it serves a
spatial market, it can employ an area monopoly strategy. In either case, the airline uses
aspects of its network as an element in its strategy.
Cost leadership
There is no indication that increasing the scale of an airline network will reduce the unit
cost of production. There are generally constant returns to scale associated with airline
network size, that is, economies of scale are minor or non existent. There are, however,
economies of scope and density that are brought about by a well configured network.
While an airline cannot substantially reduce the cost of providing available seat
kilometres (ASK) by increasing the size of its network, it can reduce unit cost by
increasing the density of its operations in the existing network. Increasing density means
making more seats available by increasing the seating capacity of aircraft or higher
frequency, and it requires less than proportional increases in labour and other operating
costs, thus allowing the airline to increase seat kilometres performed at a decreased seat
- kilometre cost.
While an airline can increase density and reduce unit costs or switch to a hub-
and-spoke network to increase network efficiency, these strategic pursuits do not
necessarily build lasting cost barriers to protect the firm in the competitive environment.
There are no substantial cost penalties preventing another firm switching to a more
efficient network configuration.
Differentiation
Carriers that offer wide service through comprehensive networks potentially could erect
product differentiation entry barriers by developing a perceived service advantage -
witness the mega carriers. In the US after deregulation, the major network strategies
observed were hub strengthening, establishing longer and stronger routes, network
extension through entry into new markets, network extension through merger or
acquisition and network changes to emphasise regional identity. In international aviation,
strategic alliances (in the form of equity swaps, seat swaps, code-sharing etc) more or
less fulfil the same objectives.
Hub-and-spoke networks allow airlines to focus on selected markets with
frequent flights and still achieve large market coverage. In addition to frequency and
traffic generation, hub systems can be used to monopolise a major market area. Once a
carrier establishes itself with a network of spokes at a particular hub, it becomes difficult
for any other carrier to challenge it competitively, unless the other carrier has resources
to develop a similar feed network. To attempt to compete on just one or two of the
individual segments into that hub becomes difficult, because the challenging carrier in
this situation must rely mainly on the local origin-destination traffic on those few
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segments while the hub dominant carrier can support a much better pattern of service
with the support of all the feed (flow) traffic.
The barriers which protect a firm that has managed to gain domination at a hub
airport are its contractual rights at the majority of airport gates. Secondary strategies are
also possible, for example, service differentiation (convenient times and destinations) and
frequent flyer p ogrammes (FFPs) and interlining and strategic alliances.
From the foregoing, it is desirable that transportation research should move into
a different modelling mode of international aviation networks and competitive strategy.
The next section proposes the procedures that should be followed. The approach is
influenced by the work of Gillen et al. (1990) and Hansen and Kanafani (1985).
The proposed modelling approach
The modelling approach adopted begins with specifying and subsequently verifying the
structural relationships between the variables to be included in the profit sub-model and
the airline game theory model. Previous approaches looking at the network variable have
incorporated it in single equation ordinary least squares cost model as a technology
factor without verifying its functional relationship with other variables.
Much of economic theory is built upon sets of systems of relationships.
Structural equation modelling is premised on the concept that the variables of interest
are part of an overall economic system, but their interaction is not exactly known. There
are three sub-models; the measurement sub-model, the structural sub-model and the
complete model system.Since we make the a priori assumption of market equilibrium in
our model of airline network competition, it is instructive that the structural relationship
be scientifically tested, and tests of variable endogeneity or exogeneity be undertaken.
The model of market equilibrium for instance is a system of structural equations
consisting of the following equations:
Demand equation: qd =  a1 r + a2 y
Supply equation: qs = b1r
Equilibrium equation:  qd = qs = qe
where: qd, qs, and qe are the quantiies demanded, supplied, and equilibrium quantities
respectively. The as and the b are coefficients to be estimated, r  is the price and y is a
vector of factors such as substitutes, complements that affect the quantity demanded.
These are structural equations in that they are derived from a theory that purports to
describe the state of airline competition at any snap shot in time. Since the model is one
of joint determination of price and quantity, they are lab lled jointly dependent or
endogenous variables.
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The cobweb model of market equilibrium, for example, to be used in btaining
the profit maximising network size and type may be written in the structural equation
form:-
Qt =  a0+ at-1 + e1t  (supply)
Pt = b0 + b1 Qt + e2t (inverse demand)
The quantity  supplied to the market (Qt) is determined by the previous period's price.
Supply in the curent period is inelastic. Demand (Pt) responds to the usual forces and
determines an equilibrium price. The as and bs are coefficients to be estimated and hee
is the error term for the relevant time period. It is imperative therefore, that the
structural relationship be determined before the full model is estimated.
A useful presentation of the network problem in structural equation form can be
specified by using Golob's framework (1993). The structural equations have a
measurement sub-model and a structural sub-model. The output of these models is the
specification of what constitute endogenous and exogenous variables. The strength of
the relationships between the variables is also specified. The structural relationships will
also assist in the specification of the data types required and the specification of the
functional form of the model. The functional form that has been predominantly adopted
is the linear additive form, where network structure and size have been included in linear
ordinary least squares equations as a technology variable. Whilst this might be in order,
the literature does not reveal any evidence of testing the linear additive specification.
The approach adopted here begins with an examination of the causal
relationships in an international airline network. The a priori assumption being made is
that there are some linear structural relationships that will be exposed. The qu sti n of
what are the exogenous and endogenous variables will be handled by the mo elling
process using appropriate software such as LISREL. Sorenson (1990) has used a similar
approach in isolating the network variable from other variables in domestic airline
competition in the US after deregulation. He, however, limits his inquiry to factor
analysis ( the measurement component of structural equation modelling).
The measurement sub-models
On the endogenous variable side it is assumed that the observed variables can be
expressed or captured by a set of unobserved latent constructs (factors):
y =  L h + e (1)
where y = observed endogenous variable
e = error term
h = exogenous latent variable
L = coefficient to be estimated
It is necessary for unbiased estimation that e is uncorrelated with h.
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On the exogenous variable side, often called predictors, covariate  or input variables, we
have:
x =  Lx z  + d (2)
where x = exogenous variable(predictors)
z = latent variable
d = error term
For unbiased estimation it is a necessary condition that d is uncorrelated with z.
The structural sub-model
The structural sub-model captures the structural relationships of the variables and is of
the form:
h =  Bh + G  x + z (3)
Unbiased estimation requires that
E(zx) = 0 ie z is uncorrelated with x.
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The complete model system
The complete model system is a combination of the measurement sub-models and the
structural sub-model systems. The general system is given by:
y =  Lyh + e
x =  Lx z  + d
h =  Bh + Gx + z (4)
where: B = causal links between the endogenous latent variables.
G = causal links (regression effects) of the exogenous variables on the 
endogenous variables.
Ly =  measurement model (factors on the endogenous variable size).
The structural parameters are the elements of the B G, Ly, Lx vectors. The remaining
parameters are error variances and ovariances. For unbiased estimation using maximum
likelihood, it is assumed that:
e is uncorrelated with h
d is uncorrelated with x
z is uncorrelated with x
and for simultaneous estimation of all sub-models, z, e, andd are all mutually
uncorrelated (Golob, 1993).
The full structural equation models are summed up in Figure 2. The arrows
represent the expected causal effects of the relationships.
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Exogenous variables                                   Endogenous variables
                                                                                                 
x2
x3
h2
h3
h1
x1
t
t
t
indicates cause-effect relationship
indicates equation errors
represents latent exogeneous variablest
x1 y1
x2 y2
x3
y3
y4 y4
y5
Figure 2 The full structural equation model (illustrative)
The principles espoused in structural equation modelli g can be applied to
networks in international aviation. Figure 3 shows the causal relationships in an
international airline network.
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Figure  3 Causal relationships in an international airline network
It is important to note that the directions of the arrows in the flow diagram are a
priori assumptions of the causal relationships. Once the model is estimated the direction
of the arrows may change. Secondly, what might at first be considered to be exogenous
variables may turn out to be otherwise. The primary specification is thus a flexible one
and the software package LISREL (Version 8) has the versatility to indicate whether the
specification is flawed or not.
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The game theory approach
Game theory provides a framework for modelling interactions between airlines when
their individual actions jointly determine the outcome. Concepts from the theory first
appeared in transportation models in the form of a behavioural hypothesis of route
choice, (Wardrop's (1952) first principle), being a Nash non-cooperative game. Network
competition is portrayed as an n-player non cooperative game in which the airlines are
assumed to be profit maximising.
The determination of what are competitively significant variables is complex. An
airline is a multi-product firm, producing flights over a large number of routes in its
network - hence the complexity. Production of flight services on one route influences
production of services on other routes by generating increased passenger flows between
routes. Each route in the airline's network represents a different product and the
characteristics of the route need to be incorporated in the modell g process.
The joint-product nature of the airline production process implies that there
exists a dependence between potentially all routes in the network system. Reynolds-
Feighan (1992) has captured this interdependence by estimating a spatial au oregressive
model, where the connection rate of passengers between different routes is used as a
measure of system inter-connectivity. This is a significant and perhaps more plausible
approach from the earlier graph theoretic measures first propounded by Kansky (1963).
Its major drawback, however, is that there is no recognition that demand data must
reflect the true O-Ds rather than mere segment flows.
The methodology
The model of airline network competition simulates the behaviour of profit maximising
airlines with different network types and hubbing locations by finding states of Nash
equilibria. In international airline network competition, two variables are competitively
significant; the first is access to routes and the second is access to hubs (airports)
(Hansen and Kanafani, 1985).
The model inputs will be specified airline network type and hub locations, airline
feed/flow characteristics, aircraft operating characteristics ie type and operating costs,
international origin-destination (O-D) demand, average fares on international routes,
inter-city/hub distances (stage lengths) and an airline route choice model of the logit
model including the type of routing - non-stop, one stop, multi stop. The airlines to be
specified in the model will have three types of networks, the turnaround route system,
the hub-and-spoke route system, and the linear network as shown in Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4 Causal relationships in an international airline network
In the turnaround route system the airline attempts to serve those markets where
there are opportunities of higher load factors due to the traffic density of the routes. The
service is invariably a direct one from the local hub to the designated international
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gateway. Frequency has to be high on these routes so as to further stimulate demand.
The hub-and-spoke system is most plausible between countries that have liberal bil er ls
or where a single aviation market exist, such as the Australia-New Zealand one. The
airline is able to obtain feed traffic from the hinterland in its home country and flow
traffic from the destination country. The linear network is characteri ed by several stops
by the airline in its home country in order to gather enough passengers. There could be
other stops in countries which have third or fourth freedom rights with the airline's home
country. Its distinguishing characteristic is that the density on the segments is relatively
low compared to the turnaround route system.
The proposed model determines the profit maximising set of frequencies for each
airline compared to the frequencies of its competitors. A cobweb algorithm is used to
search for states of competitive equilibria in which airlines have profit-maximising
frequency vectors. Ideally, a full profit model should be specified in which other
competitive variables such as fares, service quality and comfort, seat availability are
included. We, however, take frequency to be a hedonic aggregator of these variables.
Airlines decide on the level of frequency after taking into account the demand potential
of a particular route, and demand itself is partly determined by the above variables.
Besides, airline frequency is closely related to the hubbing phenomenon in hub-and-
spoke, turnaround and linear route networks. Gillen et al. (1990) endorse this approach
in their study of proposals to liberalise the US-Canada air transport bilateral.
Put more formally, the model can be expressed by assuming a set P of ode  with
np the number of nodes in the set. Demand is given by the matrix Qij. The competitive
game will be defined by identifying a set of players in the Asia-Pacific in terms of their
network strategy and performance (profit) functions. Each airline is contained in one of
np classes (1;.....np). The airlines in class k, are airlines with a particular network type
and they have a strategy defined as an np dime sional vector of frequencies ƒ(ƒ1,....., ƒk-
1, ƒk + 1,..., ƒnp). The ith element in the vector matrix in the set {0, [ƒimin., ƒimax]}
where ƒimin. is the base frequency necessary to preserve market presence and ƒimax. is
the maximum frequency permissible under a bilateral agreement of type bi. The airline
profit functions in class k  for a frequency fi will be:-
pk (ƒi) = 
S
i=1
np
   
S
j=1
np
 [{dkj • Sns/ms (ƒj, Li j ) + (1 -dkj) • Shs/nh (ƒj, ƒi, Djk +
  iSk   jSi Dik - Dij, Lij)} • Fij • Qij - 2 
S
i=1
np
C (ƒi, 
S
j=1
np
[dkj • Sns/ms (ƒj, Lij) + (1 -dkj) • Shs/nh (ƒj, ƒi,
Djk + Dik - Dij, Lij)] • Qij Dij)]
where:
pk (fi) is profit function for a given frequency fi
ƒij is the frequency between city-pairs i and j
Fij is the average fare in the market ij
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Sns/ms (•) is the market share of either a non-stop or multi-stop service in ij, and 
is a function of service frequency ƒij and the level of frequency competition 
from other airlines, Lij
Qij  is the demand in market ij
C (•) is the cost, a function of frequency (ƒij), passenger numbers (pax) and stage
length (Dij)
dkj = 1 if k = j and 0 otherwise
Shs/nh (•) are the market shares of hubbed and non-hubbed services a function of 
circuity, Djk + Dik -Di) and frequency competition, Lij.
(see Gillen et al. 1990 and Hansen and Kanafani, 1985).
Requisite data
The data necessary to implement the procedure outlined above are:
• international O-D demand data. This could be obtained from ICAO 
publications, Jane's Airline World or individual airlines
• fares on international routes. This could be obtained from the airlines' 
published fares or travel agents
• inter-city distance data could be obtained from Jane's Airline World or ABC 
World Airlines
• cost data for different aircraft types could be obtained from the BTCE's 
Aerocost model or other similar models
• revealed preference data (the actual routes chosen subject to bilaterals) for the 
logit model of airline route choice will be obtained from the airlines' 
publications of their networks. The route choice probability for traffic between a 
given city-pair is given by:
P(r,j) = exp (V(r,j))
          
å
r  exp (Vr,j))
Model output
The output will be a set of international service frequencies that define a state of non-
cooperative Nash equilibria, that is, the set of frequencies is such that each airline is
maximising its own profit, given the frequencies of other airlines - (the typical S-shaped
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frequency-market share curve). Using a cobweb algorithm, involving sequential
maximisation of each profit function, an equilibrium is reached.
The next step would be to use a method of comparative statics o compare the
profit performance of the airlines with the hypot sised network configuration. A set of
airlines in the Asia-Pacific region will be defined with an intention of portraying a set of
generic network strategies and how these can be used to gain a competitive advantage.
Conclusion
The changes that are taking place in international aviation call for a new econometric
modelling paradigm as far as competition on networks is concerned. There is a need to
incorporate the spatial and temporal components of the airline firm's network into an
analysis of the economic issues surrounding such a system. As obvious as this
requirement may seem, its implementation is difficult. The network-based models must
not only be realistic, hey must also be useful and useable. These requirements, along
with the problems involved in integrating network models with competitive strategy
ones, should be the driving forces behind efforts to find new modelli g paradigms in
international aviation.
This paper has proposed a network model of competition in international
aviation. The applicability of the model is yet to be tested with appropriate data. It is
conceivable, however, that the model proposed will be more applicable to single aviation
markets and liberal bilateral regimes. There is some evidence of a shift towards these
regimes. It is envisaged that the model may analyse competition on international airline
networks better than the traditional theories of trade in services, such as comparative
factor advantage.
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